Top American General Claims Surge is Working — Time for a Reality Check?

January 12th, 2010 by The Parallax Brief

The Telegraph reports today that the senior NATO officer in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, believes that the tide in the country is starting to turn against the Taliban.

“We’ve been at this for about seven months now and I believe we’ve made progress,” Gen Stanley McChrystal said in an interview with ABC television.

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The general recounted a recent meeting in the Helmand river valley in the country’s south – a former Taliban stronghold – as an example of progress underway.

“When I sit in an area that the Taliban controlled only seven months ago and now you meet with a shura of elders and they describe with considerable optimism the future, you sense the tide is turning,” he said.

Gen McChrystal issued a dire warning to Mr Obama in September, saying the Afghan mission could fail without more troops. Early in his presidency Mr Obama sent an additional 21,000 troops. It is these that have already begun to make a difference.

Only 8,000 to 9,000 of the second tranche of 30,000 have begun to arrive in Helmand.

Asked if Nato-led forces were shifting the momentum against Taliban insurgents, the general said: “I believe we’re doing it right now.”"

The Parallax Brief wishes he could believe such an upbeat report, and certainly hopes that NATO troops can defeat the Taliban; however, truth be told, he can’t. Indeed, he doesn’t think it’s possible for large, western democracies to win counter-insurgency wars at all.

Of course, we could, if we were willing to jettison our morality and return to the cold hearted brutality of days gone by; and if we could stomach hundreds of our boys coming home in body bags after fighting a war of dubious virtue. But we are willing to do neither, so how is it possible to combat a brutal enemy that is willing to lose 25 of his men for one of ours because he knows that if he can just hang in there long enough, time — or at least demographics, as Israel will soon discover — is on his side.

But, even looking at Afghanistan specifically, it seems strange that such an upbeat outlook has come hot on the heels of perhaps the gloomiest official prognosis yet, delivered on December 23rd during a briefing by Major General Michael Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in the country, a slide from which is pictured below, and curiously unreported by the Telegraph.

According to Wired.com’s Danger Room blog, Gen. Flynn stated during his presentation that:

The Taliban not only has the “momentum” after the most successful year in its campaign against the United States and the Kabul government. “The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely,” and, “The Taliban retains [the] required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity.”

And if that isn’t enough, Flynn also warns that “time is running out” for the American-led International Security Assistance Force. “Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse,” the report says.

The “loosely organized” Taliban is “growing more cohesive” and “increasingly effective.” The insurgents now have their own “governors” installed in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. And the “strength and ability of [that] shadow governance increasing,” according to the presentation. The Taliban’s “organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding.”

Of course, it could be that the situation has changed dramatically since Gen. Flynn gave his briefing. You decide.

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The Importance of Knowing Dick

December 3rd, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

Former Vice President Richard Cheney has been lambasted since he left office for his strident criticism of the Obama administration. Leading members of an administration are expected maintain decorum and hold back on criticism of their successors for at least a year. Daniel Drezner, the largely conservative foreign policy expert, usually defends Cheney for doing so on the principle that Cheney feels strongly enough about Obama’s policy to speak out. But even Drezner seems to have reached the limit with Cheney’s brazenly self-serving, propagandizing and lies.

So I’m inclined to cut Cheney some slack for his decision to speak out. On the other hand, when we read the Politico interview, Cheney’s actual sins come out:

“Cheney rejected any suggestion that Obama had to decide on a new strategy for Afghanistan because the one employed by the previous administration failed.

Cheney was asked if he thinks the Bush administration bears any responsibility for the disintegration of Afghanistan because of the attention and resources that were diverted to Iraq. “I basically don’t,” he replied without elaborating (emphasis added).”

Seriously? SERIOUSLY? I dare any Cheney supporter to make the argument that Afghanistan was hunky-dory until January 20, 2009, at which point things went to hell in a handbasket.

For the rest of us on the Planet Earth, there’s no way to read that passage and not come to one of two possible conclusions:

—Richard B. Cheney is a liar;

—Richard B. Cheney is so unconnected from reality that it is impossible to trust anything he says.

I don’t mind that Cheney speaks up for what he thinks is right — I mind that he’s a liar.

This matter raises two points — one of which is not that Dick Cheney is a liar, which is incontestable fact.

The first is that the problems Britain and America face now are as a direct consequence of the Bush administration’s decision to divert men and materiel from Afghanistan to Iraq. It’s worth remembering why we are in Afghanistan, because the official line on this matter has shifted so many times that that it has become the most nebulous of concepts. NATO went into Afghanistan because its government was providing shelter to those who perpetrated a horrifying terrorist attack on a NATO member. It wasn’t to nation build, improve women’s rights, or reduce the supply of heroin to the west (noble causes as they are). But, just as the job was almost done, and with Bin Laden and the Taleban and Al Qaeda leadership in within grasping distance, the Bush administration and their supine British partners decided fighting a largely unrelated war against Iraq was more important. The criminals of the century escaped; the Taleban could regroup and start an insurgency campaign against a strategically drifting and materially starved military coalition in the country.

It also, however, highlights the second problem, which is that Obama back home faces an opposition that has completely abandoned the notion of “Loyal Opposition” and will literally do or say anything to attack the President.

That isn’t to say that Obama is faultless. The Parallax Brief sees all kinds of gaps and contradictions in the President’s decision on Afghanistan, but key to understanding how we reached this point is to understand the problems created by what Cheney represents: the Obama administration faces a fantastically expensive (politically, economically, emotionally) COIN war (which are almost invariably lost by advanced western democracies) without a particularly compelling mission against a political backdrop where a hysterical opposition is willing to stoop to outright lies and rabble rousing.

Operation Panther’s Claw a Success, But Will NATO now Follow the Soviet Strategy?

November 12th, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

The BBC website has a nice info-graphic depicting Operation Panther’s Claw, the British led operation to wrest control from the Taliban an area along the Helmand River the size of the Isle of Wight. It’s worth a visit for a cursory overview of the operation, which the defence chiefs have hailed it a success.

But the Parallax Brief wonders for how long? NATO seems thus far to have been pretty successful when it comes to defeating the Taliban in battle, but less so when it comes to holding the gains. Too often, a village is hard won, only to fall back into Taliban hands as soon as the troops leave to free another area.

According to the fascinating Ghosts of Alexander blog, which the Parallax Brief found via Matthew Yglesias, the major policy debate in Washington is now whether to follow the strategy the Soviet’s settled on in the end — which would involve additional troops to take control and hold onto the urban areas and the road that circles the country, with a lighter footprint in the countryside — and if so, how many population centres will it be necessary to hold to control the whole country. The blog entry really is essential reading for anyone interested in a detailed look at the main debating areas in Afghan policy.

To get a picture what the USSR managed to achieve using this strategy, the map below indicates with shading the areas the Red Army held at the end.

It’s clear that there were still chunks of the ring road that the Red Army couldn’t quite get to grips with, but it strikes the Parallax Brief that NATO could probably make this plan work where the Soviets couldn’t. First, the NATO countries, even during the crisis, are in far better economic shape than the 1980s USSR. Second, NATO is isn’t fighting an enemy being pumped by America with billions of dollars of advanced weaponry and training. Finally, NATO’s training and more modern technology should make COIN warfare easier to execute.

So it could work. But what about the agricultural areas? Will a version of Joe Biden’s light footprint plan work there? Or will gains in the countryside be lost as quickly as they’ve been gained.

That these questions of policy are still unanswered — and the fact that even if they were the troops required for their successful execution might not be forthcoming — is extremely alarming. But that’s not what our real concern about Afghanistan should be. Because the astonishing truth of Afghanistan is that there still isn’t a firm idea of what would constitute victory, let alone the strategies to use to get there.