Benedict Brogan, on his blog on the Telegraph’s website, today highlights a point that was lost when the political hacks and talkingheads released a week or so ago their flurry of opinion editorials about the potential consequences of a hung parliament.
“Morgan Stanley Research Europe has just put out a note assessing the UK’s future prospects, and its findings are a timely addition to the hung parliament debate…”UK becomes the first of the G10 to have a major fiscal crisis as elections lead to a hung parliament. The context is an ugly fiscal picture, relatively weak economic recovery, aggressive monetary stimulus and political uncertainty”"
The easiest way to think about this point is to consider the criteria for loaning money to someone. Whether or not you loan a person money, and the interest you want for doing so, is based on your view of that person’s likelihood of paying that money back. The more likely you think it is that they will be able to pay your money back, the less interest you would want to loan them money, because the risk of not getting back the money would be reduced.
The bond market is the same. When investors buy government bonds, they set the interest rate, or yield, the government pays on those bonds. This rate is essentially a function of what the investor thinks inflation will be (because as inflation increases the investor needs a higher interest rate on the bond to cover the portion of the investment eaten by that inflation), and his view on how able the government will be to pay that money back, known as “default risk” in the trade.
Right now, the UK has high — but not catastrophically high — debt that’s fast rising because tax receipts have fallen in the face of the crisis while obligations have remained the same, or, in some cases like social security, risen. One might imagine that this would push interest rates up. But as things stand, the interest rates on government bonds in the UK are still low. Some might argue this has something to do with the Bank of England’s quantitative easing program, and there are certainly several, complex reasons for this, but it’s essentially because the UK still has enough of what’s known as “fiscal credibility”: in layman’s terms, the bond market still believes that Britain can, one way or the other, pay back it’s debt.
Paying back all that debt, though, won’t be pleasant. It will involve either tax hikes or painful public spending cuts, and more than likely both at the same time. In short, it will involve actions which will be both unpopular with the electorate and difficult to pass through parliament.
If the Conservatives are elected with a thin majority, or even take control of a minority government, how easy will it be for them to ram through an unpopular budget? Will the right of their own party let them raise taxes? Will the other parties vote for the harsh spending cuts required to get the fiscal house in order?
The bond market will have to assume that Britain’s fiscal credibility had been reduced. Wouldn’t you if it was your money?
The consequences?
The morning after an election had produced a hung parliament, the yield on British bonds would immediately increase — possibly precariously. The pound would fall, likely passing 30-year lows against the Yen, Dollar, and Swiss Franc, as well as all time lows against the Euro. The cost of borring for private businesses would jump immediately. Raising equity for larger businesses would be more difficult, as fewer investors would want to hold assets in pounds. The cost of Government borrowing would also increase, making it more difficult to continue financing the deficit, and making fiscal help for the economy ever more difficult.
The best we could hope for is that any hope of rapid recovery would be nipped in the bud, and a long, turgid slog back — something like the economic stagnation in the late 70s and early 80s — would take its place.
The worst case scenario, albeit a not particularly likely one at this stage, would be an Iceland style monetary crisis in the absence of a quick (and implausibly magnanimous) commitment from all parties to take tough steps and vote for a cross-party budget. Indeed, the effect of this type of hung parliament scenario may well be a some kind of government of national unity to get through the Commons a budget that could stave off a fiscal crisis.
Of course, this isn’t so very likely, but it’s not inconceivable. And it is through this lens that one should view the Labour Party’s decision to increase the top rate of income tax to 50p in the pound. The Parallax Brief believes that this was not to soak the rich in a pique of partisan policy making, but an effort to show the bond market that Britain, and the Labour Party, had the iron will needed to push through unpopular and politically difficult policies to get the country’s fiscal house in order.
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