The Importance of Knowing Dick

December 3rd, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

Former Vice President Richard Cheney has been lambasted since he left office for his strident criticism of the Obama administration. Leading members of an administration are expected maintain decorum and hold back on criticism of their successors for at least a year. Daniel Drezner, the largely conservative foreign policy expert, usually defends Cheney for doing so on the principle that Cheney feels strongly enough about Obama’s policy to speak out. But even Drezner seems to have reached the limit with Cheney’s brazenly self-serving, propagandizing and lies.

So I’m inclined to cut Cheney some slack for his decision to speak out. On the other hand, when we read the Politico interview, Cheney’s actual sins come out:

“Cheney rejected any suggestion that Obama had to decide on a new strategy for Afghanistan because the one employed by the previous administration failed.

Cheney was asked if he thinks the Bush administration bears any responsibility for the disintegration of Afghanistan because of the attention and resources that were diverted to Iraq. “I basically don’t,” he replied without elaborating (emphasis added).”

Seriously? SERIOUSLY? I dare any Cheney supporter to make the argument that Afghanistan was hunky-dory until January 20, 2009, at which point things went to hell in a handbasket.

For the rest of us on the Planet Earth, there’s no way to read that passage and not come to one of two possible conclusions:

—Richard B. Cheney is a liar;

—Richard B. Cheney is so unconnected from reality that it is impossible to trust anything he says.

I don’t mind that Cheney speaks up for what he thinks is right — I mind that he’s a liar.

This matter raises two points — one of which is not that Dick Cheney is a liar, which is incontestable fact.

The first is that the problems Britain and America face now are as a direct consequence of the Bush administration’s decision to divert men and materiel from Afghanistan to Iraq. It’s worth remembering why we are in Afghanistan, because the official line on this matter has shifted so many times that that it has become the most nebulous of concepts. NATO went into Afghanistan because its government was providing shelter to those who perpetrated a horrifying terrorist attack on a NATO member. It wasn’t to nation build, improve women’s rights, or reduce the supply of heroin to the west (noble causes as they are). But, just as the job was almost done, and with Bin Laden and the Taleban and Al Qaeda leadership in within grasping distance, the Bush administration and their supine British partners decided fighting a largely unrelated war against Iraq was more important. The criminals of the century escaped; the Taleban could regroup and start an insurgency campaign against a strategically drifting and materially starved military coalition in the country.

It also, however, highlights the second problem, which is that Obama back home faces an opposition that has completely abandoned the notion of “Loyal Opposition” and will literally do or say anything to attack the President.

That isn’t to say that Obama is faultless. The Parallax Brief sees all kinds of gaps and contradictions in the President’s decision on Afghanistan, but key to understanding how we reached this point is to understand the problems created by what Cheney represents: the Obama administration faces a fantastically expensive (politically, economically, emotionally) COIN war (which are almost invariably lost by advanced western democracies) without a particularly compelling mission against a political backdrop where a hysterical opposition is willing to stoop to outright lies and rabble rousing.

Operation Panther’s Claw a Success, But Will NATO now Follow the Soviet Strategy?

November 12th, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

The BBC website has a nice info-graphic depicting Operation Panther’s Claw, the British led operation to wrest control from the Taliban an area along the Helmand River the size of the Isle of Wight. It’s worth a visit for a cursory overview of the operation, which the defence chiefs have hailed it a success.

But the Parallax Brief wonders for how long? NATO seems thus far to have been pretty successful when it comes to defeating the Taliban in battle, but less so when it comes to holding the gains. Too often, a village is hard won, only to fall back into Taliban hands as soon as the troops leave to free another area.

According to the fascinating Ghosts of Alexander blog, which the Parallax Brief found via Matthew Yglesias, the major policy debate in Washington is now whether to follow the strategy the Soviet’s settled on in the end — which would involve additional troops to take control and hold onto the urban areas and the road that circles the country, with a lighter footprint in the countryside — and if so, how many population centres will it be necessary to hold to control the whole country. The blog entry really is essential reading for anyone interested in a detailed look at the main debating areas in Afghan policy.

To get a picture what the USSR managed to achieve using this strategy, the map below indicates with shading the areas the Red Army held at the end.

It’s clear that there were still chunks of the ring road that the Red Army couldn’t quite get to grips with, but it strikes the Parallax Brief that NATO could probably make this plan work where the Soviets couldn’t. First, the NATO countries, even during the crisis, are in far better economic shape than the 1980s USSR. Second, NATO is isn’t fighting an enemy being pumped by America with billions of dollars of advanced weaponry and training. Finally, NATO’s training and more modern technology should make COIN warfare easier to execute.

So it could work. But what about the agricultural areas? Will a version of Joe Biden’s light footprint plan work there? Or will gains in the countryside be lost as quickly as they’ve been gained.

That these questions of policy are still unanswered — and the fact that even if they were the troops required for their successful execution might not be forthcoming — is extremely alarming. But that’s not what our real concern about Afghanistan should be. Because the astonishing truth of Afghanistan is that there still isn’t a firm idea of what would constitute victory, let alone the strategies to use to get there.

Is Depriving Afghanistan to Terrorists a Sensible Reason to Wage War?

November 9th, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

John Redwood on his excellent blog on Saturday posed a very interesting question: “Does the war in Afghanistan make us safe in the UK?” The Parallax Brief thought he didn’t flesh out his argument enough, or take it to its logical conclusion, and later gets into analysis of COIN warfare that he probably isn’t qualified to offer, but Mr. Redwood did make some interesting points.

They go on to say that we need to fight in Afghanistan because some terrorists are trained there, and because the terrorist plotters in the UK often have links there. They link Afghanistan to Pakistan by calling the area the border badlands. Under questioning, they admit that most of the training and links are to the Pakistan side of the border, rather than the Afghanistan side. They seek to imply that the position in Pakistan would get worse if we removed troops from Afghanistan.

This argument will not wash.”

Let’s push aside for a moment the truth that British boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan act as a recruitment clarion for extremist and terrorist organizations, as well as putting Britain firmly near the top of the list of hated enemies for every lunatic Muslim terrorist.

More to the point would be to ask where terrorist attacks are planned, where are they undertaken, from where to the terrorists hail, and where are they indoctrinated? It strikes the Parallax Brief that the answer to all these questions is very unlikely to be Afghanistan or the mountainous west of Pakistan. It is actually far more likely to be Bradford, London, Paris or Hamburg.

This is borne out by fact: 9/11 was mostly planned in Hamburg (and while the Parallax Brief is sure downtown Hamburg rocks on a Saturday night, it probably isn’t quite yet in need of NATO troops to maintain order). Meantime, the 7/7 London Bombings were carried out by British citizens. And the 9/11 attackers took flying lessons in America.

Terrorists don’t need Afghanistan or the lawless tribal Af-Pak border region.

That’s because it doesn’t take a the space afforded by a sympathetic country in the Hindu Kush to radicalize a young man and then teach him how to let go of a dead man’s switch. Besides which, Al-Qaeda is a highly decentralized organization in which the various cells rarely contact eachother and where individuals in the same cell might not even be aware of one another.

If our heroes are fighting and dying in Afghanistan to deny the country to terrorists, then it is indeed a deeply flawed logic that has sent them to fight on foreign fields, and shows an asinine lack of thought on behalf of their leaders.

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Will Clegg Take a Risk on Afghanistan?

October 28th, 2009 by The Parallax Brief

Gordon Brown’s u-turn on funding for the Territorial Army (TA), reported this morning, is indicative of the hard choices the country must make when it comes to Afghanistan.

Training troops, purchasing military equipment, and the logistics needed to transport both and them keep combat ready is expensive. Really, really expensive.

Short-changing our heroes in Afghanistan would be morally reprehensible, but the money has to come from somewhere. And in an economic environment where government spending will soon have to be slashed, the massive expense of maintaining a world-class military and keeping it at war will be felt even more acutely. Simply, every pound spent on war and the agents of war is a pound that could have been spent keeping school class sizes down or not firing a nurse.

But for the moment, it seems that the public — and political points scoring — is on the side of those who believe the money should be found no matter what. Certainly, David Cameron and shadow defence spokesman Liam Fox are making much hay by hammering away on the defence ticket, a traditional blue riband Tory strength. However, there may come a time when the public starts asking why the money is being spent on the military when painful public service cuts are harshly impacting on the lives of Britons back home.

The question is: who will take the calculated political risk to make that point?

Given the Conservative Party’s traditional, strong-defence creed, and Labour’s governmental commitment and obvious aversion to the politically disastrous position of being the party to have admitted defeat, the best bet for now would be the Liberal Democrats. If Lib Dems can formulate a cogent argument that the money spent on Afghanistan is profligate in current economic climes, and then communicate the argument persuasively, it would set them apart from both Labour and the Tories, and may even boost their chances at the election. Of course, nobody wants to look like a surrender monkey, so to take a position against the war would be risky. And ultimately, despite the interesting Trident stand, the Parallax Brief believes Nick Clegg is too timid and banal to take such a bold stand.